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Introduction
Tax revenue administration in Uganda 
went through a series of reforms from 
1991–2014, with the height of these reforms 
occurring from 2004–2014. These reforms 
achieved a lot of improvement in the quality 
of tax administrators’ service delivery, tax 
compliance and revenue collection. However, 
in contrast with some other countries that 
implemented somewhat similar reforms, 
the accomplishments of Uganda’s reforms 
dwindle. One such country is Georgia. This 
paper describes Uganda and Georgia’s tax 
reforms, contrasts them and their results, 
and suggests reasons for the differences. 
The ultimate goal is to derive lessons from 
Georgia’s reform experience. These can 
then be applied in other countries, including 
Uganda moving forward.
A Contrast of Uganda and 
Georgia’s Reforms and their 
Results
A comparison of Uganda and Georgia’s 
reforms reveals that they were somewhat 
similar. However, the difference in the results 
achieved was astounding. For example, 
both countries performed organisational 
re-structuring, improved their staff incentives, 
implemented policy changes like the 
levying of a VAT with a flat rate of 18%, 
introduced electronic tax systems, improved 
their taxpayer–administrator relationships, 
simplified their tax processes, introduced 
better dispute resolution mechanisms, and 
introduced risk-based auditing supported by 
electronic tax processes.
Following these changes, Georgia’s tax to 
GDP ratio surged after the introduction of 
the reforms, but Uganda’s tax to GDP ratio 
only had a small increment at the beginning 
and then stagnated at a low average rate 
of around 13% throughout the remainder of 
the reform period. Georgia’s tax collections 
shot up and were able to fully finance the 
national budget within just a year of reform 
implementation, but to this day, Uganda has 
never been able to fully fund its national 
budget. Georgia shot up in the global ease 
of doing business ranking, but for a big part 
of the reform period, Uganda continually fell 
in the ranks. As recognised by The World 
Bank, corruption in Georgia sharply reduced, 
but in Uganda, there was no indication of a 
significant reduction. These, among others, 
are the differences creating the puzzle this 
paper scrutinises.
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Probable Reasons for the 
Differences in the Reform 
Results
The first key difference between Uganda’s 
reforms and Georgia’s reforms was that 
Georgia’s reforms were driven by stronger 
political will and backing than those of 
Uganda. Unlike Uganda’s, Georgia’s reforms 
involved joint action by the government 
as a whole; for example, the police, 
the judiciary, the parliament and other 
government arms played a major role in 
the reforms. They were not solely driven by 
the tax administration’s leadership. Political 
will for reform was lacking in Uganda, 
this was clearly demonstrated by the 
deterrent political interference in revenue 
administration during the reform period.
In Uganda, through employment 
terminations, the staff of the Uganda 
Revenue Authority clearly received the 
message of “zero tolerance to corruption”, 
but the taxpayers did not. This was because 
there was no radical action taken against 
those who were corrupt. On the contrary, 
Georgia sent its “no corruption” message 
clearly to both tax officers and the public 
through organisational clean-up and 
the arrests of big public figures. With 
corruption tendencies still being exercised 
by Uganda’s taxpayers, it was only a matter 
of time until tax officers succumbed to 
corruption once more.
In Georgia corruption detection mechanisms 
were heightened. In Uganda’s revenue 
authority, staff salaries were increased 
but this was not matched with increased 
probability of corruption detection. This 
shortfall stifled the anticipated effect of the 
measure.
The Government of Georgia provided better 
public services to its citizens after collecting 
more revenue as a result of the reforms, 
and the taxpayers were convinced of the 
need to pay taxes. In Uganda, however, 
there is no evidence to show that citizens 
acknowledged receipt of better public 
services owing to the success of improved 
revenue collections after the early tax 
reforms. If the taxpayers did not perceive 
any improvement in public services, it’s 
logical to conclude that they saw no use 
for further reform/improvement in tax 
compliance.
Key Lessons from Georgia’s 
Experience
The key lessons derived from Georgia’s 
experience are as follows. First and 
foremost, for tax reforms to be successful, 
they must be driven by both the tax 
administration leadership and the overriding 
government leadership. Secondly, in order 
to curb corruption, mind-sets must be 
transformed for both tax administrators 
and taxpayers. Additionally, early success 
of tax reforms must be matched with 
visible improvement in public service 
delivery in order to ensure sustainability 
of achievements. Tax administrators must 
be empowered to perform their duties 
without political interference. Also, tax laws 
and reforms must be applied uniformly to 
all taxpayers. Finally, in order to reduce 
corruption through salary increments for tax 
administrators, the salary increments must 
be matched with an increased probability 
of detection of corruption and guaranteed 
termination of employment when one is 
found guilty.
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